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But above all, what is absolutely imperative is to stop the outrageous expansion of settlements which is still going on. In that sense, Defence Minister Peretz absolutely needs to finally follow through on his repeated promises to uproot the illegal settlements that continue to be built. Also, recent reports indicate that there is illegal expansion going on of the older, bigger settlements, in blatant disregard of all of Israel 's international commitments, namely the promises made to US State Secretary Rice.

The reason why these moves on the Israeli side are so important is that they are likely to strengthen the moderates in Palestine and indicate that the mood in Israel has finally swung back to one more amenable to negotiations. Before the summer war with Hezbollah, Israelis were convinced of the virtues of making unilateral concessions. Now they have rejected unilateralism, but also lost the appetite for further concessions. While a majority of Israelis still consistently expresses their support for a creation of a Palestinian state, outside actors need to make Israel understand that if the moderate forces inside Palestine are to succeed (a vital precondition for negotiations to restart) Israel has to do its part. A good first step to alleviate the dire situation of ordinary Palestinians - while not strengthening the Hamas-dominated PA at the same time - would be to channel the Palestinian customs-revenues withheld by Israel through the very successful European Temporary International Mechanism. It is hard to understand why the EU and the US have not been able (or willing) to press Israel to release the money through the European mechanism.

Finally, Israel needs to make up its mind about what it wants from the Palestinians: does it want a partner for negotiations, one that can actually deliver? If that is the case, the divide-and-rule policies need to change and Israel needs to support (behind the scenes, of course) the creation of a unity government, a true interlocutor. Civil war and the ensuing chaos is not in the interest of Israel - and the Israeli military has on many occasions made this clear to the political leadership.

2. The Palestinian context: For negotiations to start, the leading political force in Palestine needs to change its political paradigm. It is true that different members of Hamas have recently made promising statements. It is also true that the Prisoner's Document was an important achievement. However, the collapse of negotiations for a unity government, the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier on Israeli territory and the massive increase in arms smuggling into Gaza, mean that Hamas isn't just rejecting a recognition of Israel for rhetorical, or tactical reasons: Hamas isn't sure yet whether it wants to follow the example of Fatah, and accept the existence of Israel, or whether it wants to be the Palestinian Hezbollah, and defeat Israel militarily.

As long as this ambiguity on the side of Hamas is apparent, the three preconditions of the Quartet to restart payments to the PA (recognition of Israel , renouncing violence and accepting previous agreements) need to be explicitly accepted by the Islamic movement. And even beyond the issue of restarting money transfers to the PA, these preconditions also have to be met if negotiations with Israel are ever to restart. They are not fetishes by the international community; they are not random excuses to avoid dealing with Hamas: rather they are meant to measure whether Hamas is ready to engage in the ideological and strategic shift which constitutes the condition sine qua non for the creation of a State of Palestine within the 1967 borders.

A unity government needs to be achieved if a civil war in Palestine is to be avoided. Hamas needs to join the PLO and agree on a common political platform based on the principle of a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel . Any future State, while enjoying a vibrant political debate, needs to be ruled by political forces that agree on the fundamentals of their collective fate as a political nation, including on how to deal with neighbours. Palestinians need to get their house in order. They need to turn into a negotiation partner. As long as the feuding continues and Hamas continues to trumpet a radical, maximalist discourse, Abbas' constitutional negotiating powers are worth very little, since he will constantly be deligitimised by Hamas and other radical elements in Palestine and beyond. Also, a majority of Palestinians voted for Hamas. In that sense, they represent the Palestinian people's wishes, at least as much as Abbas does. Only a common front will resolve these ambiguities relating not only to Israel and negotiations, but also to how the Palestinians see their relationship with Europe and the wider international community.

3. The regional context: Israelis and Palestinians are not living in a political vacuum. They are surrounded by neighbours that have a stake in the conflict. The regional context also needs to change in order for negotiations to restart. First of all, Syria needs to be engaged by Europe and the US . With mathematical certainty Damascus will boycott any positive development on the Israeli-Palestinian front if it feels its own claims (mainly to the Golan) are being neglected. The main aim of the Syrian regime is to survive. Its alliance with Iran , though important right now, is not cast in stone and, above all, is unnatural for Syria . Damascus needs to be slowly but firmly brought out of the cold. Iran and Syria 's support for the most radical elements in Palestine are a very important element in the Israeli-Palestinian equation, namely what concerns the probabilities of going back to negotiations. Damascus and Tehran can be powerful spoilers pushing Hamas closer to Hezbollah and away from Fatah.

This, the third, dimension of the debate about how to restart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is probably the one where positive developments in the near future are most unlikely. The hard-line regime in Tehran and the perceived victory for Damascus in the summer war in Lebanon-Israel, certainly do not bode well for peace. While US negligence and incompetence has contributed much to antagonize Tehran and Damascus , and while the Iraq war has poisoned the regional atmosphere almost beyond repair, it is hard to imagine in any case Ahmadinejad and Bashar Al-Asad taking a lead role in regional peace initiatives.

In this context we should highlight the negative impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the erosion of the NPT and of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes more generally. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons it will be emboldened to take a more assertive regional role. The future of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and of peace in that region more generally, is inextricably linked to the fate of non-proliferation efforts, which will have to, sooner or later, include the universalization of NPT, to include Israel . Once a regional atmosphere based on mutual recognition is in place, Israel will have no reasons to keep its nuclear arsenal.

4. The global context: Of course since 2000 a decisive element for any positive development in the region has been missing. Whether the US is willing to admit it or not, its greatest added value in the region was not its support for Israel and the moderate Arab regimes. That was the input, so to speak. The output of that, and the really important role Washington played was as an intermediary, a broker, an enabler of negotiations - and sometimes a source of pressure and incentives for Israel . Since 2000 the US have taken a back seat, getting involved tactically here and there (to ensure the opening of the Rafah crossing, for example). But the current administration's unconditional support for Israel has hurt US, Israeli, and European interests in the region. One example of this is the continuous flow of dollars to Israel , despite the expansion of the settlements. President George H.W. Bush, the father of the current President, was not the only one to threaten Israel to subtract every single dollar spent on settlements from US loan guarantees. Without a more involved and balanced message from the White House, it will be hard to reenergize the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.